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Abstract 
The volume of credit granted in the form of syndicated loans saw a marked downturn in 2008. 
This article seeks to understand how certain firms were nonetheless able to benefit from larger 
facilities or a lower interest rate than others. Using a sample of syndicated loans issued in 
2008 in North America and Europe, and records of syndicated loans since 2003, we show that 
firms that had developed a relationship with an investment bank obtained a lower spread, but 
did not benefit from greater loan facilities or longer maturities.  
JEL classification:  G10, G21, G32 
Key words: syndicated loans, banking relationship, credit rationing  
 
1. Introduction  
Syndicated bank loans have been the predominant type of financing in the world since the 
early 1990s, and were the principal source of financing for firms in the USA in the mid-
2000s
1
. However, their role in financing the economy was affected by the financial crisis, 
which brought about a sharp reduction in the overall credit facilities and the number of loans 
                                                 
1 For more details, see Altunbas, Y. et alii (2006) 
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granted in 2008 (See Tables 1a & 1b). Spreads also rose considerably during 2008, and the 
average maturity of loans issued declined. 
Table 1a.  
Change in the number of syndicated loans granted worldwide 
 USA and Canada Europe World 
2006 4,949 1,163 9,541 
2007 4,582 1,337 9,270 
2008 3,003 950 7,120 
2009 2,132 544 5,286 
Source: the authors, based on Dealscan 
Table 1b.  
Change in syndicated loan credit facilities worldwide (in millions of USD) 
 USA and Canada Europe World 
2006 20,832,310 13,282,465 41,675,365 
2007 20,418,228 15,446,835 44,614,515 
2008 10,228,538 7,715,831 24,760,228 
2009 7,670,799 5,920,042 18,235,850 
Source: the authors, based on Dealscan  
Which firms came through this crisis period best? Which firms managed to find financing on 
good terms, not only as regards the extent of the facility, but also the interest rate and 
maturity? What factors enable a firm to obtain a favourable syndicated loan, even in a time of 
crisis? This article seeks to verify whether the existence of a past relationship between the 
firm and investment banks operating on the syndicated loans market improved the firm’s 
credit terms in 2008.  
Certain articles (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, forthcoming) are starting to focus on what 
happened during the 2008 crisis, but to the best of our knowledge they do not concern the 
syndicated loans market. Spread determinants were analysed before the crisis arose, 
particularly through empirical approaches. The features of the loan agreement (especially the 
facility and the amount – see Altunbas and Gadanecz, 2004 or Bosch, 2007) are determinant, 
as is the borrower risk (Angbazo et al. 1998, Ewert and Schenk, 1998) and borrower opacity 
(Harjoto et al.1998, Bosch, 2007). One very interesting point is the role played by the syndicate 
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structure: the number of banks, but also the relative commitments of the arrangers compared to 
the participating banks explain the spread (Casolaro et al, 2003, Altunbas and Gadanecz, 2004, 
Corwin and Schultz, 2005). We take all these determinants into consideration, emphasising the 
role played by the relationship between banks and firms. The impact of these relationships on 
credit terms for small and medium-sized businesses was studied extensively in the 1990s (see 
for example Petersen & Rajan, 1994, Cole, 1998), but their role in syndicated loans remains 
largely unexplored. As far as we know, only three studies mention this factor. Bosch (2007) 
shows that a pre-existing banking relationship reduces the spread (Yasuda, 2005 reports 
similar findings for commissions, but on the bond markets). Pichler & Wilhelm (2001), in 
contrast, following the idea put forward by Sharpe (1990), provide a theoretical demonstration 
that the temporal stability of the syndicate can result in rent capture that widens the spread. 
Steffen (2007) reconciles the two views, showing that the positive effect is predominant early 
in the banking relationship, but subsequently gives way to the negative effect.  He examines 
loans issued in the UK between 1996 and 2005. The maturity and amount of the loan 
themselves are almost always considered exogenous. Nonetheless, following Schmidt-Mohr 
(1997), we believe they may be endogenous, particularly in a crisis period when rationing can 
arise more easily: banks may ration credit for businesses, by reducing the amounts they will 
lend or the maturity of their loans.  
Our article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it sets out to explain the banks’ 
reaction to the financial crisis, focusing on the features of syndicated loans issued in 2008. Next, 
it endogenises the amount loaned and the maturity, which can be rationing variables for the 
banks: not only did they increase the spread and reduce the total number of loans in 2008, they 
also reduced the average loan amount and the average maturity. Most of the existing articles 
concentrate on spread determination; this article thus provides interesting results concerning the 
determination of the amount and maturity of loans. Finally, this article shows the importance of 
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the bank/firm relationship as regards the terms of syndicated loans, based on an analysis of the 
firm’s loan record. 
We use a sample of 4,044 tranches of syndicated loans issued in the USA, Canada, and Europe 
in 2008. We construct original proxies to capture the relationship between the borrowing firm 
and the banks in the lending syndicate in 2008. To do so, we examine all syndicated loans 
issued between 2003 and 2007 to observe the history of loans and syndicates.  Simultaneous 
equations are used to determine the spread, the amount and the maturity of loans. First of all, we 
look at all the loans of 2008. We find that the number of loans a firm received between 2003 
and 2007 increases the amount it is able to borrow in 2008, and lengthens the loans’ maturity, 
but increases the spread. We then restrict the sample to firms that had a//at least one syndicated 
loan before 2008, and find that a firm that has had a previous relationship with the lead bank or 
the syndicate benefits from a lower spread. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical framework and 
the hypotheses tested, section 3 describes the data, and section 4 reports the results. Section 5 
then concludes.  
2. Background and hypothesis 
This section presents the hypotheses that will be tested using our sample. Table 2 summarises 
these hypotheses, which are discussed in more detail below. 
Table 2. 
Summary of hypotheses  
Explanatory variables Explained variables 
Spread  Amount Maturity 
1. Loan features 
Maturity  
Amount 
 
+ 
- 
  
2. External financing  
Syndicate stability 
Previous syndicated loans 
 
- 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
3. Syndicate structure 
Syndicate size 
Portion of loan financed by arrangers 
 
- 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
4. Default risk + - - 
5. Information asymmetry between the borrower and the bank + - - 
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2.1. Influence of loan features on the spread 
The duration of the loan plays a positive role in determination of the spread: a long maturity 
increases uncertainty over the risk of default by the borrowing firm, and increases the risk of 
opportunism by the firm. The amount loaned, meanwhile, is presumed to have a negative 
influence on the spread: staggering screening and monitoring costs can reduce the spread per 
euro loaned.  
2.2. Influence of past syndicated loans  
In the same way as a standard loan relationship, a firm has an informational advantage over 
the banks in the syndicate: it is better informed of the true probability of default, and there is a 
risk of opportunism. As demonstrated by the theory of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Webb, 1992, 
or Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995), and empirical studies from the 1990s (e.g. Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994 or Cole, 1998), a long-term relationship between the firm and the bank reduces 
the risk of credit rationing, and brings the interest rate down for the borrower. This is because 
it reduces the average cost of acquiring information, as that information can be reused over 
time. The moral hazard problem is also smaller if good behaviour enables the firm to benefit 
subsequently from better credit terms.  On the other hand, a long-term relationship can lead to 
rent capture by a well-informed bank (Sharpe, 1990). The argument is transposed to 
syndicated loans by Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) who show that a syndicate’s temporal 
stability can lead to rent capture. We intend to test the idea that a banking relationship 
provides an advantage, and the idea that the syndicate’s temporal stability enables firms to 
pay a lower spread, borrow a higher amount and enjoy a longer maturity. Along the same line 
of thought, we expect that the market’s knowledge of a firm will be better when the firm has 
previously received a syndicated loan, and this will improve the firm’s reputation. We can 
refer to the arguments put forward by Diamond (1989): it is in a firm’s interest to reduce risk-
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taking in order to build up and retain a good reputation on the debt market. Past operations on 
the syndicated loans market enable firms to negotiate loans with a lower spread, longer 
maturity and higher amount.  
2.3. Influence of syndicate structure 
The structure of the banking syndicate also influences the terms of the loan. First of all, the 
syndicate’s size affects risk diversification. Syndication of a loan spreads the risk between 
several lenders, thus resulting in lower risk-taking for each bank, and leads to a lower spread. 
We therefore expect the size of the syndicate to have a negative effect on the spread, and a 
positive effect on the amount loaned and the maturity of the loan. The portion of the loan 
financed by the arranging banks also plays an important role, due to the information 
asymmetry between arrangers and the other banks in the syndicate regarding the borrower’s 
true risk of default. This asymmetry creates a risk of opportunism by the well-informed 
arrangers, which can make less-informed banks reluctant to join the syndicate. However, the 
participating banks’ confidence increases if the lead bank and all the arrangers retain a large 
share of the loan, as this signals their belief in the quality of the project. The argument put 
forward by Leland and Pyle (1977) is relevant here, because this behaviour results in sub-
optimal risk diversification for the arrangers.  Also, if the arrangers hold a large share of the 
loan, they will have a greater incentive to ensure that the transaction runs smoothly. Seeing 
the arrangers finance a large share fosters greater confidence and therefore a lower spread, a 
larger amount and a longer maturity.  
2.4. Influence of default risk  
In a traditional risk/return situation, the remuneration demanded by creditors necessarily 
depends on the risk presented by the borrower, i.e. the probability that he will not repay the 
syndicated loan issued. For the borrower, the default risk increases the spread charged. This 
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risk, borne by the banks, can also lead them to reduce the amount loaned and the maturity of 
the loan. 
2.5. Influence of information asymmetry between the borrower and the banks 
The literature on banking relationships tells us that increasing the spread in a high information 
asymmetry situation, combined with borrower opacity, does not enable the bank to offset the 
risk borne due to adverse selection and adverse incentive (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Yet a 
serious information asymmetry situation generates high screening and monitoring costs for 
the bank, and these costs are passed on to the borrower through the interest rate. The spread 
thus increases with the extent of the information asymmetry. Borrower/creditor information 
asymmetry can also reduce the maturity of the loan and the amount loaned.  
3. Data 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our data is drawn from the Dealscan database. We start with all syndicated loans issued in 
2008 in Europe, Canada and the USA. The base contained 5,917 tranches of loans for 2008. 
We eliminated all tranches for which the spread, maturity, and bank syndicate nature were not 
available. This left 2,094 loans to 2,595 different firms. The analysis was applied by tranche, 
rather than by loan. Each loan consists of separate tranches, with different maturities, rank 
(senior, subordinated or mezzanine), spread and maturity. A tranche-based approach facilitates 
consideration of the risk borne by the creditor and the loan features. The sample consists of 
4,044 tranches: 3,143 issued to firms in the US and Canada, and 901 to European firms. In a 
first step, all tranches are taken into consideration in order to explain the spread, facility and 
maturity. We then restrict our sample, retaining only firms that benefited from at least one 
syndicated loan in the period 2003-2007. This applied to 2,092 tranches, but we could only 
keep those which had the necessary information in the database, and so our final subsample 
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consisted of 1,733 tranches. The objective is to incorporate more detailed information on the 
relationship between the firm and the banks in its lending syndicate in 2008. We have 
information on each of the loans received by firms between 2003 and 2007. 
3.2. Dependent variables: loan design 
We seek to explain the determinants of syndicated loan features, collectively referred to as 
Loan design. Three dependent variables are taken into consideration. FACILITY is the 
amount of each tranche, in millions of dollars. SPREAD is the number of base points that the 
borrower pays in addition to a base rate, in most cases LIBOR, sometimes EURIBOR or a 
fixed rate. MATURITY expresses the maturity of the tranche, in months. 
Table 3.  
Loan design description 
Means in bold type differ significantly between the two sub-samples. 
 FACILITY (mean, in 
millions of dollars) 
SPREAD (mean, in 
base points) 
MATURITY (mean, 
in months) 
Full sample (4,044 tranches) 195.44 266.20 52.66 
Firms that had at least one 
syndicated loan between 2003 and 
2007 (2,092 tranches) 
272.19 249.96  47.88 
Firms that had no syndicated loans 
between 2003 and 2007 (1,952 
tranches) 
113.73 283.48 57.74 
The average facility for tranches in our sample amounts to USD 195.44 million; the average 
spread is 266.20 base points and the average maturity is 52.66 months. Firms that benefited 
from at least one syndicated loan between 2003 and 2007 were able in 2008, on average, to 
borrow a significantly higher amount than firms that were not active in the syndicated loans 
market between 2003 and 2007 (USD 272.19 million against USD 113.73 million). They also 
had the advantage of paying a lower spread (249.96 base points compared to 283.48). 
However, contrary to expectations, loan maturity was shorter for firms that had previously 
taken out syndicated loans (47.88 months, against 57.74 months).  
3.3. Independent variables 
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Five types of explanatory variables are considered: banking relationship, syndicate structure, 
borrower’s default risk, information asymmetry, and control variables. Table 4 defines the 
variables used. 
Table 4. 
Definition of variables 
Variable Description 
Loan design  
FACILITY Amount of the tranche (in millions of USD) 
SPREAD  Spread compared to the benchmark rate, in base points 
MATURITY Duration of the loan (months) 
Banking relationship 1  
SEVDEAL08 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had more than one syndicated loan in 2008 
NBDEAL Number of deals (loans) concluded by the firm between 2003 and 2007 
SAMENAT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm and the lead bank come from the same 
geographical zone  
Banking relationship 2  
BPTOT Number of times the lead bank in 2008 was the bookrunner in a syndicate between 
2003 and 2007.  
STABTOT Number of times the syndicate was the same between 2003 and 2007 
AMOUNT Total amount borrowed by the firm between 2003 and 2007 
Syndicate Structure  
NBBQ Total  number of banks belonging to the syndicate 
SHARETTA Number of top-tier arrangers (TTA)/ Total number of banks 
Default Risk  
NOTESD Rating of the loan under Basel II standards 
SUBSID Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a subsidiary 
SECTFI Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the financial sector 
SECTRE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the real estate sector 
MEZZA Dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt is mezzanine debt (benchmark = senior debt) 
SUBOR 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt is subordinated debt (benchmark = senior 
debt) 
PROJFIN Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is to finance a project 
DEBTOR Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is for  “Debtor-in-Possession Financing” e.g. 
arranged by a company under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy process 
LBO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is to finance a LBO 
TAKEOVER Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is to financing a merger/acquisition 
EXIT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is an “exit facility” to help Chapter 11 
debtors to emerge from bankruptcy 
DEBTREP  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan is to repay a previous loan 
Information Asymmetry  
COTE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed 
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CLAUSEFI Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan includes a financial covenant clause 
LEAGUE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the lead bank is in the Thomson Financial “league 
table” 
Control Variables  
TRANCHES Number of tranches in the loan concerned 
NAT 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is European, 0 if it is North American 
(USA or Canada)  
 
3.3.1. Banking relationship  
Initially, we consider for all tranches whether the firm habitually operates on the syndicated 
loans market. SEVDEAL08 is equal to 1 if the firm had more than one syndicated loan in 
2008, and 0 otherwise. NBDEAL is the number of loans received by the firm between 2003 
and 2007. The relationship between the lead bank and the firm is taken into consideration 
through their geographical proximity: SAMENAT is equal to 1 if the firm and the lead bank 
come from the same geographical zone. Next, we enhance the analysis by adding more 
detailed variables on the nature of the relationship between the firm and the bank. These 
variables are only constructed for firms that had at least one loan between 2003 and 2007. 
BPTOT indicates the number of times the lead bank in 2008 was the bookrunner for a 
syndicated loan issued between 2003 and 2007. STABTOT is an indicator of syndicate 
stability: it shows the number of times the 2008 syndicate was the same for previous 
syndicated loans. AMOUNT is the total amount the firm borrowed on the syndicated loans 
market between 2003 and 2007.  
3.3.2. Syndicate structure   
Syndicate size is measured by the total number of banks (NBBQ), and the relative importance 
of the top tier arrangers is measured by the ratio of their number to the total number of banks 
(SHARETTA).  
3.3.3. Borrower default risk on the tranche under consideration  
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The measure of the borrower risk (NOTESD) is based on the Standard & Poor’s ratings 
available from Bankscope. These ratings are difficult to use in an empirical study, and have 
been converted into a weighting (from 0% to 150%) identical to the weighting used for 
standard credit risk measures under Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework. This approach offers 
two advantages: it can quantify the risk in the context of an econometric study, and makes it 
possible to incorporate observations for which the database contains no rating: taking the 
standard approach to credit risk, a 100% weighting is applied to an unrated firm. We use 
several variables to enhance the measure of default risk in each tranche. SUBSID is equal to 1 
if the firm is a subsidiary, and 0 otherwise. The sector the borrower belongs to is an important 
factor. In the period under consideration, the fact that a firm belongs to the real estate sector 
(SECTRE, equal to 1 in such a case and 0 otherwise) or the financial sector (SECTFI, equal to 
1 in such a case and 0 otherwise) theoretically indicates a higher risk, or at any rate lower 
confidence by syndicate members. We also take into consideration the loan's degree of 
subordination. For a mezzanine debt, MEZZA is equal to 1, and for a subordinated debt 
SUBORB is equal to 1. The third case – our benchmark – is a senior debt. Finally, the default 
risk borne by the syndicate depends on the intended application of the funds, in other words 
the loan purpose. We identified 26 different purposes, but ultimately only 5 of them play any 
role in determining the features of the loan. We therefore use the following 6 variables: 
PROJFIN is equal to 1 if the purpose of the loan is to finance a project; DEBTOR is equal to 
1 if the loan is for “Debtor-in-Possession Financing” arranged by a company while under the 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process; LBO is equal to 1 if the loan is undertaken to finance an LBO 
operation; TAKEOVER is equal to 1 if it is to finance a merger or acquisition operation; 
EXIT is equal to 1 if the loan is intended to finance a business recovery under Chapter 11; 
DEBTREP is equal to 1 if the loan is used to repay a previous loan.  
3.3.4. Information asymmetry   
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It is difficult to measure the scale of informational imperfections directly. Information 
asymmetry is often assessed indirectly, primarily through debtor transparency. Listed firms 
are presumed to be more transparent. We therefore use the variable COTE, a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is listed. The inclusion of financial covenant clauses in the loan 
agreement (CLAUSEFI is equal to 1 in such a case, 0 otherwise) can restrict the manager’s 
freedom of action and therefore reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the manager. 
Lastly, informational problems between the arrangers and the other banks in the syndicate are 
eased by the lead bank’s reputation. We therefore use the variable LEAGUE, which is equal to 
1 if the lead bank is included in the Dealscan league tables.  
3.3.5. Control Variables 
Two control variables are used: the number of tranches in the loan (TRANCHES), and the 
borrower’s nationality, in case there are disparities associated with the geographical area 
(NAT is equal to 1 for a European borrower and 0 for a North American borrower from the 
USA or Canada).  
Table 5.  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Full sample (4,044 tranches) Sub-sample (1,733 tranches) 
Min 
Mean or 
proportion 
Max Min 
Mean or 
proportion 
Max 
Loan design       
FACILITY  
(millions of USD) 
0.28 195.44 10419.70 0.63 271.42 10419.70 
SPREAD (bp) 5.00 266.65 2000.0 8.50 250.58 1646 
MATURITY (months) 1 52.69 354 1 47.90 336 
Banking relationship 1       
SEVDEAL08  66.05%   65.20%  
NBDEAL 0 1.24 18 1 2.41 18 
SAMENAT  51.53%   53.20%  
Banking relationship 2       
BPTOT    0 0.40 5 
STABTOT    0 0.08 5 
AMOUNT 
(millions of USD) 
   1.93 1410.2 1,142.10
5 
Syndicate Structure       
NBBQ 1 5.80 47 1 6.73 47 
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SHARETTA 2,93% 44.23% 100% 0% 41.23% 1.25% 
Default Risk       
NOTESD 20.00% 101.37% 150.00% 20% 101.73% 150% 
SUBSID  15.18%   17.26%  
SECTFI  6.45%   7.12%  
SECTRE  9.27%   7.36%  
MEZZA  1.58%   1.38%  
SUBOR  0.42%   0.38%  
PROJFIN  3.68%   1.58%  
DEBTOR  1.16%   1.96%  
LBO  18.50%   13.05%  
TAKEOVER  6.27%   8.32%  
EXIT  0.54%   0.86%  
DEBTREP   0.015%   0.019%  
Information Asymmetry       
COTE  28.39%   39.72%  
CLAUSEFI  21.19%   27.24%  
LEAGUE  10.51%   11.32%  
Control Variables       
TRANCHES 1 2.22 11 1 2.18 11 
NAT  22.28%   19.74%  
4. Methodology and empirical results 
4.1. Analysis of loan terms in 2008 
We study the determinants of the features (spread, facility and maturity) of the syndicated 
loans granted in 2008. The three dependent variables are determined simultaneously by the 
arranger when the loan is organised. As they are codetermined, we use a simultaneous 
equation model.  The following model is estimated simultaneously: 
Spread = f {banking relationship, default risk, information asymmetry, syndicate structure, facility, maturity} (1) 
Facility = f {banking relationship, default risk, information asymmetry, syndicate structure, spread, maturity} (2) 
Maturity = f {banking relationship, default risk, information asymmetry, syndicate structure, spread, facility) (3) 
We decided to use the two-stage least squares method, an equation-by-equation estimation 
method using instrumental variables. With a finite sample, the advantage of an estimate of the 
overall system is not clearly established, and an equation-by-equation estimation is perfectly 
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valid
2
.  First of all, we verified that none of the equations was under-identified, and checked 
for multicollinearity between explanatory variables.  
Table 6.  
Simultaneous regressions – Model 1 
The estimated coefficient is shown in the table. Numbers in brackets show the associated critical probability (i.e. 
the probability of error under a non-null hypothesis for the coefficient). *Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. Where no coefficient is shown, that variable has no significant impact on the dependent 
variable. 
Variable SPREAD  FACILITY MATURITY 
CONSTANT −161.478 ** 
(0.018) 
193.661 *** 
(4.00e-04) 
62.728 *** 
(2.80e-08) 
Loan design    
FACILITY −0.149* 
(0.098) 
 −0.171*** 
(7.31e-08) 
SPREAD   -0.583 *** 
(0.003) 
−0.133*** 
(5.61e-10) 
MATURITY 8.932 *** 
(3.06e-06) 
  
Banking relationship 1    
SEVDEAL08 19.307 
(0.189) 
−126.281 *** 
(9.29
e
-07) 
 
NBDEAL 11.950 *** 
(0.002) 
33.893 *** 
(1.61
e
-11) 
2.893 *** 
(0.029) 
SAMENAT    
Syndicate Structure    
NBBQ 2.942 
(0.333) 
33.272 *** 
(4.23
e
-64) 
4.928 *** 
(8.18e-07) 
SHARETTA 114.495 *** 
(9.51e-05) 
188.340 *** 
(1.51e-06) 
49.619 *** 
(6.21e-08) 
Default Risk    
NOTESD  −4.305 *** 
(1.28e-11) 
−0.180 
(0.195) 
SECTRE 65.671 ** 
(0.034) 
 −25.814*** 
(9.51e-07) 
MEZZA −15.421 
(0.704) 
 −25.444** 
(0.039)      
PROJFIN −747.983 *** 
(3.25e-07) 
  
DEBTOR 523.692 *** 
(3.93e-15) 
  
LBO −30.814 
(0.401) 
−70.334 * 
(0.058) 
26.468 *** 
(2.92
e
-07) 
                                                 
2 When there is no heteroskedasticity and no autocorrelation, the 2SLS estimator is the most efficient 
instrumental variable estimator (Greene 2008). 
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TAKEOVER 89.796 ** 
(0.049) 
454.777 *** 
(2.42e-36)  
72.006 
3.14e-06   *** 
EXIT 118.980 * 
(0.087) 
 58.593 *** 
(0.006) 
DEBTREP   −195.631 *** 
(0.005) 
 
Information asymmetry    
COTE  107.981 *** 
(2.34e-06) 
11.224 ** 
(0.031) 
CLAUSEFI −65.984 *** 
(1.93e-06) 
−47.900 * 
(0.053) 
−12.539 *** 
(0.007) 
LEAGUE 103.564 *** 
(1.09e-06) 
  
Control Variables    
TRANCHES −12.575 
(0.123) 
 6.911 *** 
(1.37e-09) 
NAT −277.630 *** 
(1.42e-18) 
64.871 * 
(0.073) 
 
Sample size 4044 4044 4044 
Our results show the link between the terms of the loan. A longer maturity leads to a higher 
spread (attributable particularly to the higher risk involved), and a higher amount leads to a 
lower spread (chiefly due to economies of scale on the bank's fixed costs). We thus confirm 
the majority findings in the literature (Angbazo et al. 1998, Casolaro et al. 2003 and Altunbas 
and Gadanecz 2004)
3
. Logically, a large spread (which is a sign of a high default risk) tends to 
reduce the amount loaned and the loan’s maturity, presumably for reasons of prudence. 
Similarly, a higher facility shortens the maturity, also for reasons of risk reduction.  
In keeping with the theoretical framework, the firm’s past financing record influences its loan 
terms. The greater the number of loans it had between 2003 and 2007, the greater the amount 
a firm could borrow in 2008 and the longer the maturity of the loan. NBDEAL, in contrast, 
has a positive influence on the spread. There are several possible explanations for this finding: 
the banks may perceive overuse of syndicated loans, instead of diversifying financing through 
traditional forms of credit and capital-raising on the markets, as a negative signal; issuing 
syndicated loans to the same firms may reduce the gain on risk diversification for the banks; 
                                                 
3  Harjoto et al. (1998), however, find a negative link between maturity and spread, and Bosch (2007) finds a 
positive link between facility and spread.   
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consistent with Sharpe (1990) and Pichler & Wilhelm (2001), the banks’ knowledge of the 
firm can generate a hold-up effect; frequent calls on the syndicated loan market increase 
firms' leverage, and therefore their default risk, and this widens the spread. Finally, the fact of 
receiving several loans in 2008 reduces the amount loaned. Firms spread their credit needs 
across the year, presumably in order to take advantage of any reversal of trends in the crisis 
environment.  
We also test the influence of the syndicate structure on financing terms. As hypothesised, the 
larger the syndicate size, the higher the amount loaned and the longer the loan maturity. Yet 
we find no significant impact on the risk premium demanded, in contrast to authors such as 
Altunbas and Gadanez (2004), who confirm a negative impact. The proportion of 
arrangers//portion of the loan financed by the arrangers ??portion of arranging banks, or 
portion of loan financed by the arrangers ?? (estimated as the percentage of arrangers in the 
total number of banks) is confirmed to have a positive effect on the amount loaned and the 
loan maturity, in line with the hypotheses tested.  However, the proportion of 
arrangers//portion of the loan financed by the arrangers meme question increases the spread 
rather than reducing it, contrary to the theoretical framework of Leland and Pye (1977) and 
other empirical studies (e.g. Casolaro et al., 2003 and Bosch, 2007). Having a larger portion 
of the loan financed by the arranging banks implies a larger borrower risk, even though the 
arrangers signal their confidence in the project to other banks in such a case. The arrangers 
will thus charge for their risk-taking through a higher spread, reflected in a higher cost of 
credit for the borrower. Another possible reason for this result is the risk of free riding in the 
monitoring activity that arises when the number of arranging banks is too high. This is the 
argument put forward by Corwin and Schlutz (2005) to explain the positive association they find 
between syndicate size and spread.  
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The default rating has a negative influence on the amount of the loan. We find no significant 
link with the spread, contrary to the results reported by Angbazo et al. (1998), Harjoto et al. 
(1998) and Bosch (2007). Another interesting finding is the role of belonging to the real estate 
sector: as expected, the impact on the spread is positive, while the impact on maturity is 
negative. This sector was the first to be hit by the current crisis, and real estate firms saw their 
cost of credit rise and the duration of loans fall as creditors lost confidence in this type of 
borrower. 
The purpose of the loan also plays a role in determining the loan design. These contrasting 
results essentially show that loans with a risky purpose, such as financing takeovers or 
business recovery, are charged a higher spread, but also involve higher amounts and longer 
maturities.  Conversely, low-risk loans such as those to be used to finance projects have a 
lower spread. 
Our results also show that informational problems play a decisive role.  
The fact that a firm is listed, and therefore better-known and subject to transparency 
obligations, enables it to borrow higher amounts over longer periods. In contrast to the 
findings of Harjoto et al. (1998) and Bosch (2007) among others, the spread is unaffected by 
listing. Inclusion of financial covenant clauses to protect creditors reduces the spread, but also 
results in lower amounts and shorter maturities. Lastly, the lead bank’s presence in the 
Dealscan “league tables” increases the spread. This cannot be explained by internal 
information asymmetries in the syndicate: the lead bank’s reputation is supposed to reduce the 
spread by reassuring the participating banks. But our finding is attributable to the information 
asymmetries between the firm and the banking syndicate: the borrower is prepared to pay a 
high spread in order to secure the services of a reputable investment bank.  
One last finding is very interesting: North American firms were charged higher spreads than 
European firms, and their facilities were lower. The crisis seems to have affected Canada and 
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the US most strongly, unless this difference in rates and loans is a permanent feature of the 
markets. The literature does show that international differences exist in rates on syndicated 
loans (see for example Christodoulakis and Olupeka, 2009). 
4.2. Analysis of previous banking relationship 
We now wish to see whether previous relationships developed by the firm with the banks in 
the 2008 syndicate improve the terms of the loan received in 2008. We study the determinants 
of loan features (spread, facility and maturity) for syndicated loans issued in 2008 to firms 
that had previously had a loan between 2003 and 2007. We restrict the sample to the 1,733 
tranches received by these firms for which the relevant information is available. The 
dependent and independent variables are the same as previously, but more variables for 
banking relationships are more detailed//the banking relationship variables yield more 
information. The econometric model is unchanged.  
Table 7. 
Simultaneous regressions – Model 2 
The estimated coefficient is shown in the table. Numbers in brackets show the associated critical probability (i.e. 
the probability of error under a non-null hypothesis for the coefficient). *Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. Where no coefficient is shown, that variable has no significant impact on the dependent 
variable. 
Variable SPREAD  FACILITY MATURITY 
CONSTANT 
-90.187** 
(0.015)      
215.478 ** 
(0.013) 
34.068 *** 
(1.31e-22) 
Loan design    
FACILITY 
-0.079***  
(3.00e-04) 
- 
2.541e-4 
(0.5696) 
SPREAD  - 
0.616 **  
(0.042)     
 
-0.040 *** 
(0.001) 
MATURITY 
2.521 *** 
(0.008) 
-0.654722 
(0.630) 
- 
Banking relationship 1    
SEVDEAL08 
65.585 *** 
(1.19e-09) 
-110.690 *** 
(0.006) 
9.052 *** 
(2.28e-05) 
NBDEAL  
18.2317 * 
(0.051) 
-2.108*** 
(1.64e-08) 
SAMENAT   
-3.184 ** 
(0.017) 
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Banking relationship 2    
BPTOT -12.540 *** 
(0.001) 
3.189     
(0.809) 
-0.368     
(0.534) 
STABTOT -48.41 *** 
(2.27e-05) 
-36.308     
(0.328) 
1.916       
(0.228) 
AMOUNT 0.004 *** 
(0.006) 
0.049*** 
(1.13e-56) 
-2.89e-04 
(0.189) 
Syndicate Structure    
NBBQ  
23.843 *** 
(4.94e-14) 
 
SHARETTA 
151.474 *** 
(2.69e-09) 
  
Default Risk    
NOTESD 
1.571 *** 
(3.18
 
e-11) 
-3.309 ** 
(0.003) 
0.183 *** 
(3.61e-06) 
SECTRE    
MEZZA    
PROJFIN    
DEBTOR    
LBO 
84.249 *** 
(0.010) 
 
 
40.220*** 
(1.34e-53) 
TAKEOVER  
475.088 *** 
(9.04e-18   ) 
 
EXIT    
DEBTREP     
Information asymmetry    
COTE    
CLAUSEFI    
LEAGUE  
122.797 ** 
(0.012) 
 
Control Variables    
TRANCHES    
NAT 
-149.762 *** 
(4.16e-13) 
  
Sample size 1733 1733 1733 
The most striking result is that a past relationship between the 2008 syndicate and the 
borrowing firm has a negative impact on the spread. Temporal stability in the syndicate 
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(measured by STABTOT, the number of times between 2003 and 2007 that the syndicate had 
the same members as in 2008) reduces the spread. A previously-established relationship with 
the lead bank (captured by BPTOT, the number of times the lead bank of 2008 was 
bookrunner for previous loans) also reduces the spread. This shows that better knowledge of 
the borrower and the existing trust outweigh the hold-up effect, contradicting the findings of 
Steffen (2008). However, the previous relationship had no significant impact on the amount 
loaned or the maturity. The total amount borrowed in 2003-2007 had a positive effect on the 
spread in 2008. A high amount might be expected to indicate high leverage, which would lead 
to a high risk premium, but AMOUNT in fact has a positive influence on the amount loaned 
in 2008 – maybe quite simply due to a firm size effect.  
The other results are basically the same as in model 1, but certain new results are worth 
noting. The fact that the bank is in the league tables increases the amount loaned, presumably 
due to the bank’s reputation. Having several syndicated loans in 2008 increases the spread. 
This is in line with our previous result: the more loans the firm had between 2003 and 2007, 
the higher its spread (see above). Finally, incorporating a more detailed firm credit record, the 
number of loans it had between 2003 and 2007 not only increases the spread, but reduces 
maturity. This suggests that extensive operation on the syndicated bank loans market is not 
favourable for a firm.  
5. Conclusion  
In the crisis of 2007 and 2008, the banks reduced the amount of credit granted and tightened 
up their terms on the syndicated loans market. Following an approach taken in the literature 
on bank credit in the 1980s and 1990s, we looked to see whether a previous relationship 
between the firm and the banking syndicate, and more generally the firm’s past credit record 
and therefore its reputation on the syndicated loans market, would cushion the firm somewhat 
against this trend towards stricter terms.  
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Constructing original variables concerning the firm's syndicated loan record between 2003 
and 2007, we show that frequent calls on the syndicated loans market are unfavourable for the 
firm in terms of spread, facility and maturity. Borrowing frequently or in large amounts on 
this market does not enable the firm to build up a positive reputation that would improve its 
credit terms, especially in a time of crisis.  
We also show that a relationship between the firm and its syndicate, particularly with the lead 
bank, improves its credit terms. More precisely, this relationship reduces the spread but does 
not affect the amount or the maturity. We thus show that if there is a hold-up effect, it is 
smaller than the positive effect arising from better knowledge of the firm and reduction of the 
moral hazard. We also show that contrary to the majority of 1990s findings on Small business 
lending, a banking relationship does not protect the firm from a reduction in its credit 
facilities.  
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